C onflict of interest (COI) has emerged as a dominant factor in the collapse of many American businesses. In health care, similarly, individual medical practitioners and large academic institutions are under increasing scrutiny for fear that financial COI have the potential to undermine the integrity of medical care and biomedical research in the United States. Nonfinancial conflicts might also be perceived as having an impact on the recruitment of research subjects or the reliability of data (1) . Although nonfinancial, institutional policy, practices, and constraints imposed by the scientific method should be able to manage most COIs (2) , universally accepted policy and standards to achieve such management do not exist (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) . We present a brief overview of some of the issues that have brought COI front and center in our national healthcare debate, along with a review of the direction society is moving in resolving these issues.
In 1999, an 18-yr-old study subject, Jesse Gelsinger, died as a result of his participation in a phase I gene therapy study at the University of Pennsylvania. Covered extensively by the press (10), there were weaknesses in the oversight and development of the clinical investigation and a financial COI on the part of one of the investigators and the University of Pennsylvania. Succinctly stated by Jesse's father, " [w] hen lives are at stake, and my son's life was at stake, money and fame should take a back seat. The concern should not be on getting to the finish line first, but on making sure no unnecessary risks are taken, no lives filled with potential and promise are lost forever, no more fathers lose there sons (11) ." In response to this incident, the American Society of Gene Therapy adopted a policy that: all investigators and team members directly responsible for patient selection, the informed consent process and/or clinical management in a trial must not have equity, stock options or comparable arrangements in companies sponsoring the trial. The American Society of Gene Therapy requests its members to abstain from or to discontinue any arrangement that is not consonant with this policy (12) .
Further concern that the trust of the public is being jeopardized by the financial interests of investigators and institutions was heightened when it became known that there were additional problems with the review and monitoring of research at other leading medical centers (13) . In a series of articles highlighting conflicts of interests by physicians and the pharmaceutical industry, patients were described as "commodities, bought and traded by testing companies and doctors" (14, 15) . Concern over COI was also raised when patients entered into research trials were not told of an institution's stake in drug development (16) or of an investigator's interest in the use of "found material" for the development of diagnostic tests or potentially lucrative therapeutic advances (17, 18) .
Little data exist describing the prevalence of COI, both financial and nonfinancial, among clinicians, institutions, or industry. Physicians and institutions stand to benefit greatly from the development of new drugs, biological agents, and medical equipment. These benefits may be financial, in the form new patents with consequent royalties, and nonfinancial, including personal gratification, academic promotion, added prestige, and community recognition of the institution. With so much at stake, reports abound on the changing relationship between industry and academia (6, 19) , the influence pharmaceutical companies are exerting over academic freedom (20, 21) , and on how research is moving away from the academic medical center setting into the community with the evolution of commercially oriented contract-research organizations and site-management organizations (22) . This latter issue is likely to have a large impact on how COIs are regulated in the future (23) .
Profits garnered from biomedical research can be enormous. In 1980, Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act (24), whose purpose was to reform national patent policy related to governmentsponsored research and to create new incentives for research collaboration between the government, industry, and academia. The act had two purposes: to allow universities, not-for-profit corporations, and small businesses to patent and commercialize their federally funded inventions and to allow federal agencies to grant exclusive licenses for their technology to provide more incentive to businesses to deploy that technology. A report of the United States General Accounting Office in 1998 identified how, under the Bayh-Dole Act, universities identified inventions, approached licensing, and shared royalties with inventors, their academic departments, and their laboratories. In 1996, under the Bayh-Dole Act, select institutions derived millions of dollars from this technology transfer, and Ͼ$24.8 billion and 215,000 jobs were added to the U.S. economy (25).
In the 1980s, a landmark case was decided in the setting of the new frontier of biomedical research. In Moore v. The Regents of the University of California (3), John Moore was suffering from hairy cell leukemia and underwent splenectomy, which was medically necessary and even may have been life saving. Researchers at the University of California continued to render care to Moore, but without Moore's knowledge, they took blood spec-imens and splenic tissue, from which ultimately they developed and patented a permanent cell line, which liberated a number of cytokines. The physician researchers entered into agreements with industry to develop and market these proteins commercially for cash and stock offerings. In response to a suit filed by Moore contesting the unconsented use of his biological materials, the California Supreme Court suggested that Moore did have the right to be informed of the uses of his tissue, even if he lacked a clear ownership right in his biological material once it had been removed from him (3). The court specifically questioned the soundness of the physicians' allegedly altruistic research intentions and asked whether they were not simply rushing to patent for financial gain (18) . These issues are now being revisited in Florida, where some families who provided their children's genetic material for research on Canavan disease have contested the uses of their children's materials. Their children's genetic material was patented by Miami Children's Hospital, which has developed a screening test, and where work on a cure for Canavan disease is in progress. The hospital has reportedly imposed strict controls on the screening tests and has demanded royalties for each test performed. According to the hospital, these royalties are necessary for it to recoup its research expenditures, and if it is not permitted to recoup these costs, future research endeavors will be stifled. The families are suing the hospital for alleged breach of informed consent (17, 26) . Meanwhile, medical journals (27) , specialty societies (28) , and government agencies are debating appropriate courses of action to guarantee the integrity of future research. Among the options being covered are additional, stricter federal regulations of financial conflicts in human subjects research.
EXISTING FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Currently, in all research funded or authorized by the Public Health Service (PHS) of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (which includes the National Institutes of Health) and by the National Science Foundation, there are requirements for investigator disclosure of their financial conflicts of interest. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also maintains various regulations relating to study investigators' conflicts of interest. Current requirements seem mostly directed toward ensuring integrity of research data rather than toward protecting human research subjects.
PHS financial disclosure requirements apply only to human research funded by a PHS agency, or proposed for PHS funding, and do not apply to privately funded research (subject to some exceptions, the National Science Foundation regulations are similar to those of the PHS) (29, 30). The PHS basic requirement is that each investigator who participates in PHSfunded research (with investigator defined broadly as all research staff who exercise professional discretion regarding study data) must submit for review to an official at the research institution a listing of his or her "significant financial interests" 1) that would reasonably appear to be affected by the research for which PHS funding is sought and 2) in entities whose financial interests would reasonably appear to be affected by the research (31). The financial disclosure to the institution by investigators must be made by the time a grant application is submitted to the PHS and then updated either annually or as new reportable significant financial interests are obtained. The definition of "reasonably appear to be affected by the research" is not specific and provides little guidance on this issue. The result has been that individual institutions set their own individual guidelines or definitions.
Financial interests are defined as anything of monetary value, including cash; consulting fees or honoraria; stocks or other equitable interests, patents, copyrights, or other intellectual property rights; and royalties from intellectual property rights (32). Significant financial interests are payments received in 1 yr by the investigator, including payments to his or her spouse and dependent children, that are expected to be Ͼ$10,000 (32). If the relevant ownership interest of the investigator, spouse, and children is worth Ͼ$10,000 or constitutes Ͼ5% ownership interest in a single organization, it too must be reported (32). Notably, these financial interests do not include salary and other compensation from the research institution, income from seminars, teaching, or lectures sponsored by public or not-for-profit entities, and income from serving on advisory committees or review panels for public or not-for-profit entities, and they do not include holdings in mutual funds (32).
PHS regulations allow for management of conflicts through internal institutional policies. The institution must establish guidelines for its designated official to take action to ensure that the conflicts are managed, reduced, or eliminated (33). The institution must enforce these policies and sanction violators as appropriate (34).
Some of the potential methods and conditions that an institution may utilize to manage the conflicts of interest, include:
• Publicly disclosing the financial interest • Having independent reviewers monitor the research • Modifying the research plan • Disqualifying certain investigators from participation in the research • Requiring the investigator to divest the significant financial relationship • Severing relationships that create actual or potential conflicts
Under the PHS regulations, institutions are also allowed to develop any "reasonable alternative solutions" for managing the conflicting interests (35).
FDA financial disclosure requirements apply to a pharmaceutical company, device manufacturer, or other party that has submitted a marketing application to the FDA for approval of a human drug, device, or biological product and that submits to the FDA the results of "covered clinical studies" as a proposed basis for FDA approval (36). These financial disclosures are retrospective, as they are submitted with the FDA application for marketing approval. Clinical investigators (broadly defined as in the PHS regulations) and their research institutions do not have a direct reporting obligation to the FDA, but investigators are obligated by the regulations to provide the research sponsor with sufficient financial information to enable the study sponsor to meet its disclosure obligations to the FDA. For every clinical investigator who participates in a "covered clinical study," the applicant (i.e., the research sponsor) must disclose to the FDA, using Form FDA 3455, the nature of the following financial interests of the clinical investigators:
1. Any financial arrangement between the sponsor and the clinical investigator in which the value of the com-pensation to the investigator for conducting the study could be influenced by the outcome of the clinical studies, such as payments that are higher for a favorable study outcome, including royalty payments for sales of the product or an ownership interest in the sponsor of the study. 2. Any other compensation from the sponsor of the study to the investigator or the institution to support activities of the investigator that is worth Ͼ$25,000 (not including the costs of conducting the study), which is given while the clinical investigator is conducting the study or within 1 yr after completing the study. Examples of this type of compensation include grants for ongoing research, equipment and honoraria. 3. Any property or financial interest in the tested product held by the clinical investigator, including patents, copyrights, or licensing agreements. 4. Any ownership or other financial interest (including stock and stock options) in the sponsor held by the clinical investigator, the value of which cannot be easily determined by reference to public prices, or any ownership interest in a publicly traded company that exceeds $50,000 during the time that the investigator is conducting the study or within 1 yr after completion of such study. 5. Any steps taken to reduce the bias created by these disclosed financial relationships (37).
Notable differences exist between PHS and FDA financial reporting requirements. First, of course, PHS maintains a lower dollar threshold than the FDA. Second, whereas PHS requirements focus on financial interests that reasonably appear to be affected by the research, the FDA requirements focus on conflicts relating to the relationship between the investigator and the research sponsor. Third, disclosure/reporting to the FDA is retrospective (at the time an application is submitted to the FDA), whereas PHS requirements are prospective, when research is contemplated and PHS funds are sought to support that research. Of utmost importance is that neither agencies' requirements apply to privately funded "home-grown" or "institutionally sponsored" studies not used for FDA applications. Finally, neither the FDA nor PHS requirements mandate disclosure of the precise compensation flowing to the investigator or institution for a research study, and neither set of regulations imposes a "fair market value" standard for this research-related compensation.
A 2001 report of the United States General Accounting Office (38) revealed disparate policies and procedures regarding individual investigators' financial conflicts of interest in five universities studied. The universities' policies differed in their content, such as the kinds of financial relationships they considered to be manageable conflicts, and in their implementation. Although they used similar management strategies for conflicts, they differed in how they employed those strategies. The universities generally acknowledged a need for better coordination of information about investigators' financial relationships. They reported confusion regarding the conditions under which COI must be reported and what the universities themselves are required to report. All institutions had "firewalls" in place to isolate the universities' investments from academic and research affairs (a means of regulating institutional financial conflicts of interest).
DEBATE INTENSIFIES
Over the past few years, federal agencies, medical journals, and research institutions have developed guidelines by which conflicts of interest can be minimized. As a result of an August 2000 National Institutes of Health meeting, Health and Human Services' Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP) released the Draft Interim Guidance: Financial Relationships in Clinical Research (39) , and expects to issue a final guidance in late 2002. Noting that many institutions have established a COI committee, the Guidance indicates that such a committee is useful in keeping the institutional review board (IRB) from bearing the burden of becoming the main group to consider these issues and that the COI committee's findings on how the institution should manage the conflicts should be shared with the IRB. The Guidance also recommends that institutions annually collect and review the financial interests in commercial sponsors of IRB staff, the IRB chair, and of IRB members, and it suggests that institutions educate and train investigators and IRB members on COI issues. Although not a mandate, the Draft Guidance introduces the concept of IRB consideration of disclosure of financial relationships/conflicts in informed consent forms. Although offering recommendations on identifying and managing individual investigator's conflicts, the Draft Guidance fails to offer detailed suggestions on how to identify and manage the institution's own COIs.
The role of the IRB in managing COIs is controversial. Health and Human Services regulations stipulate that no IRB member may participate in the IRB's initial or continuing review of a project in which the member has a conflicting interest, except to provide information requested by the IRB (40). COI is not precisely defined in these IRB regulations but would seem not to be solely financial. The potential for conflicts of interest should be considered when selecting IRB members. When IRB members frequently have conflicts (i.e., often serve as principal investigators) and must abstain from deliberation and voting, their contributions to group review processes may be diminished and could hinder review procedures. The problem is even more severe if the conflicted member is the IRB chair.
In mid-2001, the National Human Research Protection Advisory Committee (NHRPAC), having as part of its charter the responsibility and duty to advise OHRP, commented extensively on the OHRP Draft Interim Guidance. NHRPAC asked for clarification between financial relationships and COI, as the presence of a financial relationship may not represent any conflict. NHRPAC emphasized the need for confidentiality in the financial disclosure process. Lack of confidentiality might serve as a disincentive for researchers to disclose, especially in "close" cases where a potential COI is unclear. NHRPAC endorsed threshold amounts for disclosure policies (including honoraria, trips, and investments), below which a financial interest would be so minimal that it could not be interpreted as a COI. Noting the inconsistencies between PHS and FDA regulations, NHRPAC favored the stricter PHS standard of $10,000 (or Ͻ5% ownership interest) and recommended that this standard apply to all research, regardless of the source of funding (41) . NHRPAC recommended analyzing research compensation to ensure that such compensation would fall within the variables of fair market value for services rendered. NHRPAC recognized, however, that a COI analysis should take account of compelling and necessary exceptions in which a COI would be willingly tolerated. For example, when treating rare medical conditions with an innovative medical device, it may impose an undue burden on the patient if the investigator who developed the device were unable to render care. As others have agreed (7) , NHRPAC would not leave the process of monitoring compliance with COI standards to the IRB. Noting that IRBs are already overburdened, NHRPAC suggested creation of an adjunct COI process. The COI committee would receive and analyze financial disclosures and report to the IRB its findings as necessary before IRB review. Yet how such a process could be implemented in community-based research with "freestanding" IRBs is speculative at the best, because these freestanding IRBs lack an overall institutional structure that could support a COI committee. Furthermore, such IRBs have an inherent conflict of their own when pharmaceutical companies or device manufacturers financially support the IRBs reviewing the company's protocol (42) . NHRPAC guidance stated that if a financial COI on the part of the institution or clinical investigator had not been or could not be eliminated, what the financial arrangement is and how that conflict is being managed should be disclosed in the informed consent document. The document should explain what additional protections (such as COI management methods) have been put in place. NHRPAC suggested that the IRB consider special measures to modify the consent process when a potential COI exists. These could include having a nonbiased third party obtain consent, especially when the potential COI could influence the tone or presentation of information during the consent process. NHRPAC felt that disclosure should not be a cheap and easy substitute for actively identifying and managing conflicts. How precisely to make this disclosure to patients remains uncertain, but in the case of real conflict, NHRPAC thought that the conflict should be disclosed.
The Association of American Universities (AAU) (43) and the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) (44, 45) each have each generated recommendations on individual and institutional conflicts of interest in clinical research. Both documents emphasize the need for high standards for institutional conflicts when human subjects are involved.
The AAU task force concluded that the problem is rarely a particular conflict itself but rather that the question is what should be done with the conflict. AAU emphasized robust campus-wide management systems in which institutions have adequate procedures for identifying potential conflicts through annual disclosure, along with rigorous and consistent review of such disclosures. These procedures should indicate how relevant officials are informed of conflicts and how the conflicts are to be managed. AAU endorsed the creation of COI committees and suggested that IRBs must develop disclosure thresholds to determine whether there has been adequate informed consent. The AAU document also addresses the significant potential of compromising the university's mission due to potential conflicts involving university equity holdings or royalty arrangements or in circumstances in which university officials make decisions with institution-wide implications. Questions are raised by the AAU regarding management of endowments and gift funds and regarding the roles of university officials when they are members of corporate boards.
The positions of the AAMC on individual conflicts are similar to those of NHRPAC. The AAMC, for example, also endorses a threshold for financial disclosures in keeping with the requirements of the PHS. An important aspect of the AAMC's position is that it recognizes that "in some cases, an official's position may convey an authority that is so pervasive or a responsibility for research programs or administration that is so direct that a conflict between the individual's financial interests and the institution's human subjects research should also be considered an 'institutional conflict of interest'" (44) . To identify whether a particular institutional financial relationship may effect or reasonably seem to affect human subjects involved in research conducted at or under the auspices of an institution, the AAMC recommends a specific, fact-driven inquiry in the following circumstances:
A. When the institution is entitled to receive royalties from the sale of the investigational product that is the subject of the research. B. When, through its technology licensing activities or investments related to such activities, the institution has obtained an equity interest or an entitlement to equity of any value (including options or warrants) in a nonpublicly traded sponsor of human subjects research at the institution. C. When, through technology licensing activities or investments related to such activities, the institution has obtained an ownership interest or an entitlement to equity (including options or warrants) of Ͼ$100,000 in value in a publiclytraded sponsor of human subjects research at the institution. D. When, with regard to a specific research project to be conducted at or under the auspices of the institution, institutional officials with direct responsibility for human subjects research hold a significant financial interest in the commercial research sponsor or the investigational product. Significant financial interest is defined for this purpose as one or more of the following: 1. An equity interest or entitlement to equity (including options or warrants) of any amount in a nonpublicly traded sponsor of human subjects research conducted at or under the auspices of the institution. 2. An equity interest or entitlement to equity (including options or warrants) in excess of the de minimis amount (and not including exceptions for certain mutual funds), as defined in the AAMC's 2001 guidelines (that of the PHS) for individual financial interests, in a publicly traded sponsor of human subjects research conducted at or under the auspices of the institution. 3. Consulting fees, honoraria, gifts or other emoluments, or "in kind" compensation from a sponsor of human subjects research conducted at or under the auspices of the institution that in the aggregate exceeded the de minimis amount as defined in the AAMC's 2001 guidelines for individual financial interests or are expected to exceed that amount in the next 12 months. 4. An appointment to serve, in either a personal or representative capacity, as an officer, director, or board member of a commercial sponsor of human subjects research conducted at or under the auspices of the in-stitution, regardless of whether remuneration is received for such service. 5. An appointment to serve on the scientific advisory board of a commercial sponsor of human subjects research conducted at or under the auspices of the institution, unless the official has no current significant financial interest in the sponsor or the investigational product and agrees not to hold such an interest for a period of no less than 3 yrs after completion of any related research conducted at or under the auspices of the institution (44) .
In defining these standards for institutional conflicts of interest, the AAMC has gone far beyond current minimum federal legal requirements, which, as discussed earlier, relate only to investigators of PHS and National Science Foundation-funded research, IRB members, and investigators of studies that are later used to support FDA applications. However, as demonstrated by the Gelsinger case and by other cases (16, 46) , great concerns may arise in regard to institutional conflicts in human subjects research. We may expect that even without federal regulations on these points, many academic medical centers and universities will begin to develop policies on institutional conflicts and that the pace of such internal regulation might be accelerated by any common law findings of liability in which institutional conflicts have been tolerated without management or disclosure to human subjects.
CONCLUSION
The premises for ethical conduct of interventional clinical research are well established. In clinical encounters, physicians are expected to attend solely to the welfare of the individual patient. When a patient is entered into a research protocol, there is no guarantee that the individual will benefit from the intervention. Entry must be voluntary and with the patient's informed consent. Before discussing the risks and benefits of participation in the research endeavor, the investigators must do all that is possible to identify, minimize, and articulate any actual or potential significant risks to the research subject. Articulation of risks must not be influenced by potential benefits to investigators, their institutions, or study sponsors. Study subjects must know, whether the researchers intentions' are purely scientific, that the investigation is not intended specifically to meet the healthcare needs of the subjects but that the study may ultimately lead to improved patient care. Although investigators and institutions may ultimately benefit financially or in stature, these potential end points must not compromise the well-being of the subject.
Federal regulations identify rudimentary conflicts of interest on the part of individual investigators, but these regulations have many gaps. The current debate over identification and management of conflicts has broadened our understanding of these conflicts and, rightfully, has identified institutional conflicts as a concern. The integrity of our research relies on the development of a transparent system to identify, minimize, and manage conflict without stifling the scientific curiosity of investigators and on allowing investigators the personal and the financial rewards associated with their work. Standards on how to identify, manage, and eradicate these conflicts are now rapidly evolving, with increased government oversight and stricter standards likely. 
